Both father and son were killed just minutes after they took off
NTSB officials said a more experienced pilot told 53-year-old
Thaddeus Lazowski “not to take any chances” and wait for better weather before he took off from Woodbine Airport on November 14, according to
Press of Atlantic City.
It was the tail end of a three-day Nor’easter,
Tropical Storm Ida, that caused widespread damage, flooding and gusty winds throughout South Jersey.
Lazowski and his 12-year-old son, also named Thaddeus, were both killed when their single-engine Piper Arrow went down into a nearby wooded just minutes after taking off from Woodbine Municipal Airport in
Cape May County, about 20 miles southwest of
Atlantic City.
The two were flying to Indiana for a hunting trip.
It is not known if weather played a role in the crash. However visibility was about two to three miles, according to the report.
The forecast was expected to improve later in the day, according to the NTSB report.
NTSB Identification: ERA10FA062
14 CFR Part 91: General Aviation
Accident occurred Saturday, November 14, 2009 in Dennisville, NJ
Aircraft: PIPER PA-28R-200, registration: N4499T
Injuries: 2 Fatal.
This is preliminary information, subject to change, and may contain errors. Any errors in this report will be corrected when the final report has been completed.
On November 14, 2009, about 1050 eastern standard time, a Piper PA-28R-200, N4499T, was substantially damaged when it impacted terrain about 10 minutes after takeoff from Woodbine Airport (OBI), Woodbine, New Jersey. The certificated, non-instrument-rated private pilot/owner, and his 12 year old son, were fatally injured. The personal flight was operated under the provisions of 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91. Instrument meteorological conditions (IMC) prevailed, and no flight plan was filed for the flight to Monroe County Airport (BMG), Bloomington, Indiana.
According to several witnesses, the pilot originally planned to depart for BMG on Thursday, November 12, but weather conditions caused him to decide to delay his departure. The following day, he came to the airport, again due to inclement weather, the pilot decided not to depart for BMG. While at the airport, the pilot requested assistance from the airport manager, who also had conducted the pilot's most recent flight review, for assistance in using an internet-based flight planning tool. At some point during the day, the pilot met a flying companion in a local restaurant, and the two spoke of the pilot's planned flight, and how the existing weather conditions had again delayed the flight. During that conversation, the companion cautioned the pilot "not to take any chances," and to wait for the weather to improve.
On the morning of the accident, IMC prevailed, but the forecast called for conditions to improve as the day progressed. The recorded weather conditions at OBI reported an overcast ceiling at 300 feet above ground level (agl) for the period from 1000 to 1200; this ceiling was below the minimum values for the published instrument approach procedures into OBI. Several other pilots, including some who were instrument-rated, were either in the airport office, or elsewhere on the airport, waiting for conditions to improve so that they could fly. About 1015, these witnesses observed the pilot and his son at the fuel dock, fueling the airplane. The witnesses universally reported that a solid overcast ceiling was present at 200 to 300 feet agl, that "there were no holes" in the ceiling, and that "there was no sun" shining anywhere that they could see. All witnesses who observed the pilot fueling the airplane stated that they "assumed," due to the low ceiling, that the pilot would return his airplane to the hangar after fueling was completed. The OBI fueling records indicated that the pilot completed the purchase of 20.7 gallons of fuel at 1030. Shortly thereafter, several witnesses saw and/or heard the airplane near the threshold for runway 31.
About 1040, the pilot utilized the Unicom frequency to broadcast his intention to depart, and he began his takeoff roll on runway 31. Several persons, some of whom knew the pilot and who also knew that he was not instrument-rated, watched the airplane take off, and climb into the overcast. One witness stated that the airplane entered the overcast "between the end of the runway and the railroad tracks," which crossed the extended runway centerline approximately 1/3 mile beyond the runway end. Three witnesses in a maintenance hangar at OBI had access to a radio that could receive aviation frequencies, and after the airplane took off, they changed the frequency on the radio to 124.6 megahertz (MHz), which was the frequency for Atlantic City approach control. They heard the pilot request traffic "advisories," and although they could not hear the controller, understood that the controller assigned the airplane a discrete transponder code.
Witnesses on and near the airport reported that they heard, and occasionally saw, for a period of between 5 and 10 minutes, an airplane flying in their vicinity. All witnesses reported that the sound varied in a way that gave them the impression that the airplane was continuously changing speed and direction, as if it was climbing, descending and circling. One witness, who was in his backyard with his daughter, stated that he was familiar with how airplanes typically sounded, but "this one was different." The continued variation in sound gave him the impression that the airplane was performing aerobatics, and he questioned the pilot's judgment for performing aerobatics in the clouds. He then saw the airplane fly over his neighbor's house. He said that he "never saw a plane that low before," and he sent his daughter inside for her safety. Another witness at the airport saw the airplane emerge from the overcast, headed away from him to the west, and disappear below the treeline. He then saw the airplane re-emerge, and climb back up into the overcast. All witnesses reported that their sightings of the airplane were very brief, and lasted only a few seconds.
Another witness and his wife were sitting in their kitchen, and heard the airplane apparently circling. They then heard a "bang" or a "clunk," which was followed by a "hard thud." One witness heard the airplane strike tree branches. Most witnesses only reported a single sound of impact, which some described as a "thump." Two residents, who lived in separate homes approximately 1/2 mile from the accident site, ran into the woods behind their homes in search of the airplane. They located the main wreckage, checked the airplane occupants for vital signs, found none, and notified authorities via a mobile telephone. According to the New Jersey State Police, the first 911 call was placed at 1059.
According to Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) and Piper information, the airplane was a four-place, low-wing monoplane of all-metal construction, with retractable, tricycle-style landing gear. The design utilized an all-moving tailplane known as a stabilator. Each wing was equipped with an integral "wet wing" fuel tank, with a usable fuel capacity of 24 gallons. The three-bladed constant-speed propeller was driven by a Lycoming IO-360 series piston engine.
The airplane was manufactured in 1972, and was first registered to the pilot in 2005. A review of maintenance records indicated that the most recent annual inspection was completed on September 12, 2009, and at that time, the airplane had accumulated a total time in service of 2,378 hours. The engine had the same amount of time in service, and it had accumulated 887 hours since its most recent major overhaul when the inspection was completed. The propeller had accumulated a total time in service of 335 hours at the time of the annual inspection.
The accident site and wreckage was examined in detail beginning the day after the accident. Airplane components were found in two locations; at the main wreckage site, and along a debris path that consisted of portions of the left wing and left stabilator. The main wreckage site was located approximately 3,500 feet south-southwest of the threshold of OBI runway 1.
The outboard 8 feet of the left wing, and the outboard 3 feet of the left stabilator, as well as part of the left aileron and some wingtip fragments, were distributed along a debris path approximately 1,100 feet south of the main wreckage. The first item in the debris path was the aft end of the left wingtip, and the last item was the outboard left stabilator. The wingtip fragment was approximately 1,300 feet south of the main wreckage. The northernmost component in the debris path was the stabilator, which was 400 feet north-northeast of the aft wingtip fragment. The left outboard wing section was found approximately midway between those two components.
The outboard wing section consisted of the wing and the outboard section of the left aileron, including the aileron balance weight. The inboard section of the left aileron was found approximately 100 feet west of the wing section. The outboard wing section skin and spar damage was consistent with deflection of the wing in the upward direction, and the aileron displayed similar deformation. No corrosion, fretting, or other indications of pre-impact failure were observed on the spar cap or web fracture surfaces of the wing or aileron. The only crush or impact damage to the wing section was near the wingtip, primarily in a spanwise direction from outboard to inboard. The damage to the left outboard stabilator was consistent with deflection in the upward direction.
The main wreckage was tightly contained, and consisted of the entire airplane, with the exception of the outboard portions of the left wing and left stabilator. The airplane's ground impact point was demarcated by a 2-foot-deep crater with an east-west dimension of approximately 10 feet, and a north-south dimension of 5 feet. Most of the main wreckage was situated adjacent to the northern and eastern boundaries of the crater. Most structural components exhibited significant disruption and deformation. The upper-aft fuselage and tailcone/empennage was separated from the rest of the airplane. The lower fuselage and cockpit area were found inverted. The aft seats had been removed prior to the flight, and were subsequently found in the pilot's hangar.
Most of the cockpit instruments were damaged and unreadable. The tachometer registered a time of 2,387.15 hours. The artificial horizon and the directional gyro were removed and retained for further examination. The frequencies set into the top-most navigation/communication radio could not be determined. The communication radio below that radio was set to 122.00 MHz. The autopilot mode selector was set to "HDG," but the operational status of the unit could not be determined. The engine controls were all found in their full forward positions. The flap handle was impact damaged and displaced upward. The remainder of the switch and control positions were deemed to be unreliable. The pre-impact flap position could not be determined. The landing gear were found in the retracted position. Both wing fuel tanks were highly fragmented, and did not contain any fuel.
The entire right wing was located with the main wreckage, and exhibited extensive crush and deformation damage. The outboard section of the right wing was fracture-separated outboard of the main landing gear. The forward and aft wing-to-fuselage attach points were fractured. The aileron and flap remained attached to the right wing. The aileron balance weight was separated from the aileron, but was found adjacent to the wing. The inboard section of the left wing, including the left flap, was also located with the main wreckage, and exhibited extensive crush and deformation damage. No corrosion, fretting or other indications of pre-impact failure were observed on the spar cap or web fracture surfaces of the inboard section of the left wing.
The main portion of the empennage, including the vertical stabilizer and rudder, was entangled with the left inboard wing section. The center section of the stabilator remained attached at both hinge points. The balance tube remained attached to the stabilator, but was displaced aft of its design location. The right outboard end of the stabilator was separated and found adjacent to the rest of the empennage. All rudder hinges remained securely attached and undamaged.
All aerodynamic control surfaces were found at the accident site, and the wreckage was examined for control continuity. The right aileron cable was intact from the cockpit control to the aileron bellcrank. The left aileron cable was intact from the cockpit control to the left wing separation point, and the cable fracture was consistent with overload failure. The aileron balance cable was attached to and continuous from the right aileron bellcrank to the left wing separation point, and the separation point damage was consistent with overload failure of the cable. The stabilator cables both remained attached to the forward "T bar" in the cockpit, and continuous to the stabilator balance tube attach points; both attach points were fracture-separated from the balance tube. The two rudder cables remained attached to the cockpit rudder bar, and continuous aft to the fuselage break; the cable end fractures were consistent with overload failure. Both rudder control cable attach points remained with the rudder. The right rudder cable was pulled from the ball swage but the ball remained in the attach clevis. The left cable was secure at the attach point, but the cable was separated about 3 feet forward of the attach clevis. The stabilator pitch trim drum showed 16 threads of extension, which was consistent with a full airplane nose up setting, and a tab deflection of 12 degrees tab down. According to the airplane manufacturer, the as-found position "may not reflect the actual trim setting prior to impact."
Both rudder stop bolts were undamaged and secure, with head heights of approximately 3/8 inch above the hinge plate. All four stabilator stop bolts were undamaged and secure, with head heights of approximately 3/8 inch above their mounting pad surface.
The engine remained partially attached to the engine mount and firewall. The lower engine case was cracked. The intake and exhaust tubes were partially crushed and bent. The muffler, one magneto and some other components were separated from the engine. The internal surfaces of the muffler and other exhaust tubing were light gray/white, which was consistent with normal operation. The fuel distribution block ("spider") and the engine-driven fuel pump contained fuel that appeared uncontaminated. The vacuum pump was removed and retained for further examination. Visual examination of the engine did not reveal indications of any pre-impact failures.
All three propeller blades remained attached to the hub, which remained attached to the engine. One blade was straight, and the other two were twisted and bent aft nearly 90 degrees. All blades displayed some chordwise scratching. A 5-inch diameter tree was cut through at an angle; the cut was 143 inches above the ground, and 134 inches from the center of the ground impact crater.
FAA records indicated that the pilot held a private pilot certificate, with an airplane single engine land rating, that was obtained in 2004. His most recent FAA third-class medical certificate was obtained in September 2007, at which time he reported 300 total hours of flight experience. Examination of the pilot's personal flight time log indicated as of the date of the accident, he had approximately 395 total hours of flight experience, including 308 in the accident airplane make and model, all of which was obtained in the accident airplane. His most recent flight review was completed in December 2008.
According to Lockheed Martin (LM), the pilot contacted Lansing FAA Contract Facility / Automated Flight Service Station the night before the accident flight, and obtained an abbreviated briefing. In addition, LM checked with the Direct Access User Terminals (DUATS) vendors, and their records indicated that no services were provided by the vendors, but that the pilot attempted to utilize the system four times on November 13, and once (at 0752) on the morning of the accident.. A printed copy of a "CSC DUATS on the Web" flight planning sheet from OBI to BMG was found in the wreckage. The sheet listed a departure time of 1300 on November 14, 2009, and an enroute altitude of 6,000 feet.
The OBI recorded weather observations at 5 minute intervals for the period from 1000 to 1200, reported an overcast ceiling at 300 feet agl. During that same period, the reported visibility ranged from 1 3/4 miles to 3 miles, and the temperature and dew point remained constant at 14 degrees C, with the exception of the first two dew point readings of 13 degrees C. Examination of other weather data indicated that the region was blanketed by a layer of stratus clouds that was approximately 3,000 feet thick, and pilot reports (PIREPs) corroborated these findings.
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