Saturday, January 23, 2016

Beech G36 Bonanza, Rural Health Outreach Inc., N536G: Fatal accident occurred May 23, 2014 in Silver City, Grant County, New Mexico

Deal reached in Aldo plane crash suit

From left to right: Ella Kirk, Michael Mahl and Ella Myers. 

Dr. Peter Hochla 


The lawsuit is settled; the healing can begin. The three families and one school left reeling in the wake of the deaths of Aldo Leopold Charter School students Ella Jaz Kirk, 14, Michael Mahl, 16, and Ella Myers, 16, have agreed to a settlement over damages caused by negligence in the accident.

Ella Jaz Kirk, Michael Mahl and Ella Myers died in a plane crash on May 23, 2014, after the students, part of the Youth Conservation Corps Eco Monitoring program at Aldo Leopold Charter School, flew with private pilot Dr. Peter Hochla to view the Signal Fire burn scar. Detailed reports from the National Transportation and Safety Board showed that early that Friday, Hochla made several flight errors that caused the crash and deaths of all those onboard. This has been publicly corroborated by an independent pilot who has claimed Hochla was not qualified to be operating the aircraft in question.

The independent pilot’s “report debunks the myths that were going around after the crash that Dr. Hochla was a hero by somehow, seconds before the crash, maneuvering the plane from hitting the trailer park. The report clearly states that he did not have the skill set to be flying this high performance aircraft into any type of adverse weather, let alone with such precious cargo,” said John Mahl, Michael’s father, in a release from the families.

The families of the deceased students have consistently sought accountability for the roles played by the teacher, the school, and the pilot in the events leading up to the crash, according to a release from the families on the occasion of the settlement.

“It was clear from the depositions the school immediately tried to deflect responsibility by saying it wasn’t a school trip. They shifted it to the teacher who put the kids on the plane, yet they never asked him to take a leave of absence, nor did they do a thorough investigation of what happened leading up to the crash,” said Brian Myers, father of Ella Myers, in the release. “There has been much misinformation because of the school’s position and it has caused all our families additional undue grief and anxiety.”

While the school has agreed to the terms of the settlement, ALCS Director Eric Ahner has expressed concern about the focus of media coverage on individuals involved in the tragedy.

“We are quite upset with how we feel those terms have been portrayed in public,” Ahner wrote in an email to the Daily Press. “Not just that the settlement is still not final, but because the press release is unfair and downright mean in its treatment of two of the people who have suffered hugely from this tragedy: the pilot of the plane who lost his life and the teacher who arranged the trip. We don’t wish to debate the actions of these two people in public, but we do wish for a more civil and honest depiction of events.”

Ahner emphasized that the settlement had still not been fully executed.

“Both our lawyer and the plaintiffs’ lawyer have expressed concern that the statements that are being made in the press are premature. But assuming nothing changes, yes, we are content with the terms, or else we would not have agreed to them. There were some initial demands that we felt were misguided and that we did not agree to, and they are not part of the settlement,” he wrote.

In the settlement, the families received not only the state’s maximum — if perhaps insufficient — disbursement of $750,000, which will be split among the three families, but also several measures of accountability from the school itself. Ahner said the school is not directly responsible for the financial disbursement, which will be handled through the New Mexico Public School Insurance Authority. The terms of settlement do require the school governing council and Ahner to sign a letter of apology, acknowledging the school’s responsibility in the tragedy, as well as writing a letter of reprimand to teacher Steve Blake, who arranged the fatal flight.

The final condition is an independent risk assessment to evaluate the school’s decision-making and practices in experiential education. Since the school’s experiential education program is one of its cornerstones, that could have a substantial impact, although school officials did not comment on how the risk analysis might affect the school.

However, on the school’s reaction and the aftermath of the tragedy, they had much to say.

“I wish that I had had the wisdom and understanding immediately after the tragedy to state to the community and to the parents of Ella, Michael, and Ella that this event was very much school-related. I never intended to suggest that their devotion to monitoring forest health was separate from their roles as students at Aldo Leopold,” Ahner wrote. “But at the risk of appearing to shirk responsibility, I must add that the flight was not a school-approved activity, and it did not go through our extensive, safety-focused approval process. Because it took place after school let out, the teacher believed it was not appropriate to treat it as a normal school trip. I wish he had not made that choice, but I understand why he made it.”

In any case, even after the settlement, both the parents and the school are left reeling.

“More than anything, I consider this kind of blame-seeking to be a slippery slope. It’s so easy to contemplate the ‘what ifs’ after a tragedy. While we have the luxury, as humans, to contemplate and reflect, we don’t have the ability to change the past, as much as we all wish that we could under such circumstances,” Ahner wrote. “What’s most important now for the school is to find ways to focus on the lives of Ella, Michael, and Ella, and to continue to pursue the legacy they left us of loving life through art, music, science, learning, and pursuing dreams.”

“My daughter, Ella Jaz, was a truth seeker; she was not afraid to speak out when she felt something needed to be heard. Ella was with me when I went to the school just three weeks after her passing and insisted that Aldo Leopold Charter School take responsibility for their part in this tragedy, and learn from their mistakes, just as I have had to do,” said Patrice Mutchnick, mother of Ella Kirk, in the release. “I hope coming to a settlement causes the school to self reflect, show humility, and helps them make the substantial changes we and the community expected when our children died serving their school. Doing these things now brings meaning to our children’s sacrifice. Ella would be proud of us.”

The three students were gifted writers, musicians, photographers, filmmakers, and conservationists, according to the parents’ release. During their time as Eco-Monitors, they served their community and school by monitoring water quality on the Gila River and San Vicente Creek, measuring soil and forest health in burned areas, and teaching local elementary students watershed ecology. Flying over the Signal Peak burn area was their last assignment.

Original article can be found here:

Left-to-right: Michael Mahl, 16, Ella Kirk, 14, and Ella Myers, 16.

Ella Jaz Kirk

Michael Sebastian Mahl 

Ella Myers

NTSB Identification: CEN14FA249 
14 CFR Part 91: General Aviation
Accident occurred Friday, May 23, 2014 in Silver City, NM
Probable Cause Approval Date: 09/17/2015
Aircraft: RAYTHEON AIRCRAFT COMPANY G36, registration: N536G
Injuries: 4 Fatal.

NTSB investigators either traveled in support of this investigation or conducted a significant amount of investigative work without any travel, and used data obtained from various sources to prepare this aircraft accident report.

The airplane was returning from a local flight and the pilot flew a tight downwind leg for landing on runway 35, possibly due to a direct crosswind in excess of 20 knots. During the base turn, the airplane overshot the final course, and the pilot used at least 60 degrees of bank to correct the airplane back on course and over the runway. The airplane then bounced and touched down at least 20 knots above the manufacturer’s published approach speed with about 1,810 ft remaining on the runway. The airplane’s airspeed began to rapidly decrease, but then several seconds later, the airplane’s airspeed increased as the pilot rejected the landing. The airplane did not gain significant altitude or airspeed then began a slight right turn. The airplane’s roll rate then sharply increased, and the airplane quickly descended, consistent with a stall, before colliding with a transmission wire and terrain. Examination of the airframe and engine did not reveal any preimpact anomalies that would have precluded normal operation. Strong, variable, gusty wind, with an environment conductive to the formation of dry microbursts, was present at the airport at the time of the accident. Several lightning strikes were recorded in the vicinity of the accident site around the time of the accident. It is unknown if the presence of lightning or wind impacted the pilot’s inflight decision-making in the pattern, on approach, or during the attempted go-around. The circumstances of the accident are consistent with an in-flight encounter with a strong tailwind and/or windshear during climbout after the rejected landing.

An autopsy conducted on the pilot identified significant stenosis of a distal coronary artery without any other evidence of cardiac distress; however, if there was an associated medical event, the condition would likely result in sudden incapacitation, which is not consistent with the airplane’s coordinated flight profile. 

The National Transportation Safety Board determines the probable cause(s) of this accident as follows:
The airplane’s encounter with a strong tailwind and/or windshear, which resulted in an inadvertent stall. Contributing to the accident was the pilot’s continuation of the unstable approach, long landing, and delayed decision to conduct a go-around.


On May 23, 2014, at 1553 mountain daylight time, a Raytheon G36 airplane, N536G, impacted terrain near Silver City, New Mexico. The private pilot and three passengers were fatally injured. The airplane was destroyed. The airplane was registered to Rural Health Outreach Inc. and operated by the pilot under the provisions of 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91 as a personal flight. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed for the flight that operated without a flight plan. The local flight originated from the Whiskey Creek Airport (94E), Silver City, New Mexico, at 1536.

Several witnesses at 94E saw the airplane just prior to the accident. One witness at 94E saw the airplane in the pattern for runway 35. He noted that the airplane's position on downwind was "tight" in relation to the airport. The airplane began a "very tight base leg that was at least a 60 degree bank." The witness described the winds as gusty, around 25-30 knots, as would be associated with the passage of a thunderstorm. The airplane tightened the base to final turn and overshot the final approach leg. The witness estimated that the airplane's first touchdown occurred near mid-field, where it bounced and then settled to the runway. Shortly thereafter, the engine sounded as if the pilot had applied full engine power. The airplane was seen travelling down the runway and then took off. The airplane's landing gear and flaps appeared to both be down. The airplane began gaining altitude and started a slight right turn. The witness said that the airplane stalled and descended out of sight.

Another witness observed the airplane in a "tight left downwind approach for runway 35 at about 600-800" feet above ground level. The airplane's groundspeed increased in the base turn and the airplane flew through the runway's extended centerline. The airplane used at least 60 degrees of bank to correct back towards the runway's centerline. The airplane landed and then attempted to go around. The airplane went off the end of the runway at a high angle of attack, descended slightly into the valley, and then began to gain altitude. The airplane started a 15° bank turn to the east, began to descend, and the airplane's angle of attack got "steeper" as the airplane descended out of sight.

A witness near the accident site saw the airplane "gradually roll to the right, and then "sharply pitch" to the right where it impacted the ground."

The airplane impacted desert terrain near several trailer homes. A post impact fire ensued and consumed a majority of the airplane.


The pilot, age 67, held a private pilot certificate with ratings for airplane single engine land and instrument airplane. The pilot flew his airplane frequently to treat patients at remote medical clinics. A review of the pilot's log book found that the last completed page ended on March 14, 2014. As of that date, the pilot logged a total of 3,547.7 hours. The preceding log book entries indicated that the pilot flew on average 15 hours per month, so the pilot's total flight time was about 3,600 hours prior to the accident. The pilot's flight review, which included an instrument proficiency check, was completed on December 16, 2012, in the accident airplane. On January 29, 2014, the pilot was issued a second class medical certificate with the restrictions that the pilot must wear corrective lenses for near and distant vision. The medical examination also noted mild cataracts and his retina showed no holes, tears, or retinal detachment.


The single engine, low wing, six-seat, retractable gear airplane, serial number E-3707, was manufactured in 2006. It was powered by a single 300-horsepower Continental Motors IO-550-B engine, serial number 675766, that drove a metal Hartzell three bladed, variable pitch propeller. The airplane's last inspection was an annual type accomplished on June 6, 2013, at an airframe total time of 1,105.8 hours. On October 3, 2013, the engine was overhauled and modified by a supplemental type certificate. The overhauled engine was installed in the airplane on November 1, 2013 at a total airframe time of 1,156.1 hours. The most recent hour meter recorded in the logbooks was for maintenance performed on April 8, 2014, at a total airframe time of 1,229.4 hours.


At 1555, an automated weather reporting station located at the Grant Country Airport (KSVC), located about 8.75 nautical miles southeast of the accident site reported wind from 270 degrees at 21 knots gusting to 28 knots, visibility 10 miles, ceiling broken at 10,000 feet, temperature 70 degrees Fahrenheit (F), dew point 34 degrees F, and a barometric pressure of 30.04 inches of mercury.

A weather study was conducted for the accident area. Atmosphere data retrieved from a weather balloon launch at 1800 from Santa Teresa, New Mexico, identified an environment conducive to "dry microbursts." This area had a potential for severe weather gusts of 68 knots and microburst gust potential of 50 knots. Weather radar data identified patterns consistent with developing and decaying convective activity in the vicinity of the accident site near the time of the accident. Some storm cell decay occurred south of the accident location with 10-15 minutes prior to the accident. In addition, from 1539-1555, several lightning strikes were detected within 10 miles of the accident site.


The Whiskey Creek Airport (94E) is a public airport located at measured altitude of 6,126 feet mean sea level. It has one runway 17/35, 5,400 feet by 50 feet, of asphalt construction in good condition.


The airplane impacted desert terrain near several trailer homes, about 0.8 miles northeast of runway 35's departure end. The airplane's first impact point was a transmission wire located west of the accident site about 25 feet above the ground. Forty feet east of the transmission wire was a ground crater which contained the airplane's propeller. The debris path was roughly cone shaped, was aligned on a 77° magnetic heading, and was about 140 feet long and 70 feet at its widest area. A postimpact fire ensued which consumed a majority of the airplane. The main wreckage contained remnants of the cabin, fuselage, wings, and empennage. The wreckage came to rest facing a 228° heading.

Both ailerons were partially consumed by the postimpact fire and remnants remained attached to their respective wing. The left aileron trim actuator extension was measured and found to be about 1.75 inches, which corresponded to about 7° trim tab trailing edge down. Aileron control continuity was established from the flight controls to each wing bell crank. Aileron trim control cable continuity was confirmed from the cockpit to the aileron trim actuator. The flaps actuator indicated the flaps were up. The left and right elevator flight control surfaces were partially consumed by the postimpact fire. Remnants of the elevators remained attached to their respective horizontal stabilizer. The left and right elevator trim actuator extensions were measured and found to be 1.625 inches, which corresponded between 10-15° trim tab trailing edge down, airplane nose up. Elevator control continuity was confirmed from the cockpit to the elevator surfaces. The elevator trim control cables were confirmed from the cockpit to the trim actuators. The rudder was partially consumed by the postimpact fire and remnants remained attached to the vertical stabilizer. Rudder control continuity was established from the cockpit to the rudder bell crank. The gear handle was found in the down position. The fuel selector was found selecting the right main tank. No preimpact anomalies were detected with the airframe.

The engine was impacted damaged and found separated from the airframe. Both magnetos were actuated by hand and found to produce a spark at each terminal. The fuel manifold valve screen was clear of debris and all fuel nozzles were found clear of blockages. The throttle body and fuel metering unit's fuel screen contained a small amount of fibrous material but was largely unobstructed. The crankshaft was able to be turned by hand with continuity established throughout the engine. Cylinder thumb compression and suction was confirmed to each cylinder. A borescope inspection of each cylinder found normal operation and combustion signatures. No preimpact anomalies were detected with the engine.

The propeller blades were labelled "A", "B", and "C" for documentation purposes only. All three blades displayed signatures of chordwise scratches, leading edge nicks and gouges, and blade polishing. Blade B was curled near the tip and the tip of the blade was found separated. Blade C displayed S-bending along its entire length.

A Garmin Oregon 450t hand held GPS was found in the debris field and was sent to the NTSB laboratories for a data download.


An autopsy was authorized and conducted on the pilot by the New Mexico Office of the Medical Investigator. The cause of death was the result of multiple blunt trauma and the manner of death was ruled an accident. The autopsy identified 80% stenosis of the distal third left anterior descending coronary artery. All other arteries were free of stenosis.

Forensic toxicology was performed on specimens from the pilot by the FAA Bioaeronautical Sciences Research Laboratory, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma. Testing detected the presence of oxymetazonline which is a decongestant used in the treatment of nasal congestion.


Pilot Operating Handbook

Beechcraft's Model G36 Bonanza Pilot's Operating Handbook (POH), revised July 2014, listed the maximum demonstrated crosswind limit as 17 knots.

The Normal Procedures section lists the balked landing checklist:

1. Throttle and Propeller … Full Forward
2. Airspeed …80 KTS (until clear of obstacles, then trim to 110 KTS)
3. Flaps … UP
4. Landing Gear … RETRACT
5. Cowl Flaps … OPEN

Published landing performance data for the airplane is predicated on a threshold speed between 78-81 knots depending on the airplane's weight. Published performance data does not exist for landings in excess of the published approach speeds or in excess of 10 knots of tailwind. Using a gross weight of 3,400 pounds, a direct crosswind of 20 knots, 70° F, and an approach speed of 80 knots, engineers from Textron Aviation estimated the required landing distance at 1,720 feet.

The POH provided a chart of stall speeds with idle power. The chart was run for the airplane's final configuration of flaps up and airplane gross weights between 2,800-3,600 pounds. The stall speed at 30° of bank would be between 66-72 knots.


Garmin Oregon 450t

The Garmin Oregon 450t is a battery operated hand-portable GPS receiver with a 12 channel wide area augmentation system (WAAS). The unit contains an electronic compass and a barometric pressure sensor for recording pressure-based altitude information. Published GPS position location accuracy is less than 33 feet horizontal under normal conditions, and 10-16 feet with differential global positioning system (DGPS) active. Although the device was thermally damaged, the airplane's last flight track was extracted. For the accident flight, the device was powered on at 1401 and recorded the airplane's takeoff time of 1536 as the flight departed on runway 17. The airplane turned to the north and flew about 13 miles north in an area between Black Peak and New Mexico Highway 15. The airplane then returned back to 94E and entered a left base turn for runway 35. Starting at 1551, the GPS update rate began to vary and there were two episodes of where the GPS receiver momentarily lost satellite lock and continued to record position information based on projected data. About 1552:15, as the airplane turned left towards the runway, the receiver lost satellite lock and the airplane's position returned at 1552:42 as the airplane was over the runway. At that time, the airplane was about 770 feet down the runway and 175 feet above ground level. At 1552:53, the airplane touched down with a groundspeed of 120 knots, skipped, and touched down 3 seconds later at 100 knots groundspeed with about 1,810 feet remaining on the runway. The airplane slowed to 87 knots and with 1,060 feet remaining on the runway the airplane's groundspeed began to increase. The airplane lifted off from the runway, flew to the north, and began a slight climb. At 1553:12, the airplane began to turn right at a rate of about 3-4° per second. About 1553:26, the receiver again lost satellite lock and regained the airplane's position about 30 seconds later at the accident site. The final portion of the accident sequence was not captured by the device.


An Apple iPhone was located in the airplane's wreckage and shipped to the NTSB laboratories for download. Data extracted from the iPhone showed that none of the video files were date/time stamped on the day of the accident. Thirty eight of the image files were date/time stamped on the day of the accident. Most of these files depicted persons and aircraft on the ground. Ten of these files corresponded with previews or full resolution images of the view off the right wing from inside an aircraft in-flight. The file containing the most recent image was taken at 15:46:35 MDT. There was no data which could aid in reconstructing in accident sequence.

Secure Digital (SD) Card

An SD card was found in a thermally damaged camera in the airplane's wreckage. The SD card was extracted from the camera and shipped to the NTSB laboratories for download. Data extracted from the SD card found that two of the video files were date/time stamped on the day of the accident. Twenty of the image files were date/time stamped on the day of the accident. All of the image files corresponded with external views of an airplane on the ground or in-flight views looking forward or off the right wing. The most recent image was time stamped 1546 MDT. The two video files depicted in-flight views looking forward or off the right wing from an airplane in level flight. There was no data which could aid in reconstructing in accident sequence.


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